Protests in Serbia entered their seventh consecutive night on August 18, as violent clashes between anti-government demonstrators, regime supporters and riot police become a bedtime routine.

Initially sparked by a tragic incident at a railway station in Novi Sad, when a roof collapsed killing 16 people underneath it, the protests were first driven by rage and a demand for accountability. For the better part of nine months, the demonstrations were peaceful and garnered significant public sympathy.

However, since last Tuesday, August 12, violent confrontations have become a nightly occurrence, spreading from smaller towns such as Vrbas and Bačka Palanka to Belgrade, Novi Sad and Valjevo. 

The protests’ character has shifted. Demonstrators set fire to and vandalise the offices of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). Meanwhile, reports of police brutality and minors being held in custody have fuelled public outrage.

Pro-government supporters have been implicated in initiating violence, with footage showing them attacking protesters while riot police stand by. The government’s response—marked by heavy-handed policing, inflammatory rhetoric and the pardoning of individuals involved in violent acts against protesters—has exacerbated tensions.

The shift to violence is driven by a confluence of factors, including frustration and desperation of protesters whose demands remain unmet despite months of activism.

The government’s hardening stance appears calculated to provoke and discredit the protest movement by portraying it as violent and illegitimate. President Aleksandar Vucic's administration has framed protesters as disruptors or agents of a foreign-instigated “colour revolution” from the start.

Summer timing has likely influenced this strategy. With many residents on holiday, the government may have sought to isolate protesters and undermine their public support. The active involvement of armed pro-government groups in attacks on demonstrators suggests an orchestrated effort to shift the protest dynamic from peaceful dissent to violent confrontation, hoping to weaken public sympathy and justify repression.

At the same time, the opposition remains fragmented and without a clear leadership or platform. The student movement has consciously avoided formal alliances with traditional opposition parties, many of which suffer from low public support and organisational weakness. This fragmentation constrains the protest movement’s political leverage and complicates prospects for a unified challenge to the SNS.

The current escalation ushers Serbia into a period of sustained political uncertainty. President Vucic has not ruled out holding elections before the 2027 deadline, but his regime’s next moves remain opaque.

Elections, while likely to calm tensions, appear unlikely unless the SNS is confident of maintaining its parliamentary majority. Recent opinion polls indicate declining support for Vucic and the SNS, making snap polls a risky proposition for the regime.

Without a credible opposition alternative, public patience risks wearing thin. Protest participation, though still significant, has declined from earlier peaks, and ongoing unrest disrupts normal life and the economy. However, the geographic spread and scale of protests signal that the underlying grievances are deeply felt.

Externally, Serbia remains buffered by cautious Western engagement. The EU and other Western actors continue to view Vucic as a stabilising presence in a volatile region, limiting external pressure for substantive political reform. In this context, Serbia is likely to experience a protracted phase of low-intensity unrest and political stalemate rather than a swift resolution.

Economically, the outlook is subdued. Investor confidence has waned amid political turmoil, and growth prospects have weakened. The regime’s tolerance of corruption and politicisation of institutions have undercut the gains of the past decade, which had bolstered the SNS’s core support base.

Ultimately, Serbia’s protests reflect a deeper societal conflict—a clash between a population increasingly disillusioned by autocratic governance and a ruling elite determined to retain power.

The regime’s gamble on repression and division carries high risks. Should violence escalate further or a fatal incident occur, the fragile political equilibrium could shatter, potentially triggering a broader crisis. Conversely, if the government’s hardline tactics succeed in intimidating the opposition and fracturing public resolve, the unrest may dissipate without political change.

For now, Serbia remains a case study in the limits of authoritarian resilience within a formally democratic framework—a flawed democracy where economic progress coexists uneasily with popular dissatisfaction and civic unrest. The coming months will test whether Serbia’s fragile social contract can withstand the pressure or whether it will crack under the strain of popular discontent.