Donald Trump’s increasingly transactional and confrontational posture towards India appears – at least on the surface – to be behind New Delhi’s efforts to recalibrate its relationship with Beijing.

But while first impressions point towards a swing eastwards by the government of Narendra Modi, India’s long-standing security concerns about China, especially in the northern Himalayan region, make it unlikely that New Delhi will all-together abandon its long-held posture of non-alignment – or as some more cynical India-watchers call it - fence-sitting.

Trump frictions

Since taking office, the Trump administration has introduced sweeping trade measures that at times appear to target India in particular. New tariffs of up to 50% on certain Indian exports, including crude oil purchases linked to Russia have triggered serious and widely reported diplomatic fallout. These measures have been viewed in India not purely as economic policy but as a test of New Delhi-Washington ties. They have eroded trust and prompted concerns in some Indian political circles that the US may be prioritising short-term leverage over a long-standing and durable partnership.

That Trump is in his second term as president and without a major legal battle, is unable to run for a third term, it is thought he may already be working to leave behind a degree of economic success to benefit the next Republican candidate for the presidency.

Trump’s public rhetoric meanwhile has amplified the US-Indian anxiety. His claim that India and Russia appear “lost” to “deepest, darkest China” hit many across India as more than just an exaggeration. It was widely viewed as a US president actively working to actively demean the world’s largest democracy.

Modi’s balancing act

To this end, the visit by Prime Minister Modi to China earlier in the month, the first in seven years, has only added fuel to the fire and confirmed the claim that India is drifting into Beijing’s orbit, agencies including Reuters have claimed.

The Modi-Xi meeting in Tianjin, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, saw India and China pledging to de-escalate border tensions, restore people-to-people ties in various sectors and crucially to resume normal trade relations.

Efforts by India to work towards stability in the area of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) only added to talk of New Delhi and Beijing drawing closer together.

That said, the shift is far from total. India isn’t openly embracing Beijing. The historical distrust over border issues between the two remains. Concerns over infrastructure projects in Tibet, and China’s own relationship with India’s longtime irritation that is Islamabad, remains deeply entrenched. So much so that a recent US Defence Intelligence assessment reported by The Economic Times stated that India considers China its primary adversary, with Pakistan now relegated to a secondary concern.

Autonomy over preference

Because of this, what actually appears to be at play is not a pivot towards China, but more a reaffirmation of India’s own autonomy in the eyes of 1.4bn and the wider world.

New Delhi has consistently shown it will not be pushed into choosing sides, even under intense diplomatic and/or economic pressure. Public opinion in the country reflects this nuance with surveys reported by The Economic Times indicating that as many as 43% of Indians view China as the greatest security threat. Many reportedly also see a degree of risk in being too closely tied to either Beijing or Washington.

This posture thus aligns with India’s long-term strategic culture under the current prime minister: a strong, multi-angled level of diplomacy being seen to put India and Indians first while keeping all other suitors, genuine or otherwise, at arms length.

By way of this modus operandi, New Delhi has successfully maintained contact with the US defence, tech, and trade sectors. while simultaneously staying engaged with Chinese interests across Asia.

Washington annoyed

For the US, India has long been seen to ‘serve’ as a crucial piece of its Indo-Pacific strategy - a democratically led counterweight to China.

That India is now standing up for itself and refusing to merely follow the daily whims of an unbalanced regime in Washington is thus vexing in the extreme for the White House. But when policies undercut trade partners and erode trust as has become the go-to under President Trump, even allies become wary.

As such, Washington’s use of aggressive tariffs and trade rhetoric not only risks pushing India further towards China, it risks opening a new frontier in Asia-Pacific geopolitics - one marked by hedging and self-determination on the part of India and, to New Delhi at least, open arms on the part of Beijing.

For China, the opportunity is simple - to present itself as a more stable and reliable partner than the US under Trump, especially in sectors such as trade, and regional multilateral forums. Even with the unresolved border claims in the Himalayas, Beijing is no longer the obvious opponent it once was in Asian or global politics.

That said, while Trump’s policies may appear to be nudging India ever closer towards China in diplomatic and economic circles, there is no overwhelming evidence that India is abandoning its core posture.

Instead, New Delhi is doubling down on its non-alignment, hedging its bets, and ultimately preserving its options.

In gambling-speak, India has mastered the art of poker face. Don’t expect that to change any time soon.