As battlefield momentum shifts and diplomatic channels intensify, Ukraine is approaching what analysts describe as a “negotiated-outcome phase” in the war with Russia, driven less by strategic preference than by mounting pressure on military and political capacity.

“US diplomatic efforts are moving into detail just as Ukrainian military and European fiscal capacity tightens,” said Balazs Jarabik, a political analyst with R.Politik and former OSCE adviser. “Bottom line: the endgame is approaching, shaped by pressure rather than preference,” he wrote on social media on December 10 in an extended analysis titled Essential Ukraine #13.

Jarabik noted that Washington now operates two distinct settlement tracks — one with Kyiv and one with Moscow — structured around four clusters: territory, security guarantees, Nato and European architecture, and sanctions and reconstruction.

“In Kyiv, withdrawal from Donbas remains politically indistinguishable from capitulation,” he said. Territorial concessions are a non-starter for Ukrainian leadership. “Security guarantees are another hinge: without them, any settlement looks like the 2022 Istanbul peace deal,” he added, referring to the failed early negotiations in the first months of the full-scale invasion.

One of the most alarming developments, Jarabik argued, is the deteriorating state of Ukraine’s armed forces. “Russian gains in 2025 have been ~80% faster than in 2024,” he said. “Some UAF battalions now fight with fewer than 20 active soldiers, brigades with 200 total. This is no longer rotation fatigue but structural degradation of force capacity.”

He warned of a growing strategic dilemma between the Donbas and southern Ukraine. “Holding Donbas preserves legitimacy, but the South holds the economy,” he said, pointing to the potential “Khersonization” of Zaporizhzhia — a process of isolation and attrition that could render the region indefensible if Ukrainian forces remain overcommitted in the East.

On the technological front, Russia’s advantage in drone warfare is becoming more apparent. “Russia produces 40k+ Geran drone, an Iranian-designed Shahed-136 loitering munition drones per year for $20,000 each,” Jarabik said. “Intercepting even 95% still leaves Russia ahead on cost-per-strike.”

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s energy grid has become a strategic target. Jarabik noted that Kyiv and central regions now meet only 20–25% of electricity demand, with thermal and hydroelectric generation down by as much as 90%. “Russia weakens the system without triggering total collapse — it avoids 750 kV substations, thus bringing systemic grid failure,” he said.

Financially, Europe’s key instrument — frozen Russian assets — remains in legal limbo.

“Belgium won’t take liability alone; [the EU emergency action clause] Article 122 risks precedent of rule-by-emergency,” Jarabik explained. “If assets stay frozen, Ukraine returns to short-horizon financing.”

Politically, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s authority is becoming increasingly precarious. “Zelenskiy’s mandate is now conditional. With no new head of [the presidential administration] appointed, governance is drifting by default,” he said.

Public opinion is also shifting, with “52% opposing a second term, yet no succession structure exists.”

Jarabik concluded that Russia currently holds a strategic upper hand, escalating “selectively: enough to grind Ukraine down, not enough to force Western rupture.”

He pointed to the latest US National Security Strategy (NSS), which confirms a shift toward managing European security “with Russia as a stakeholder,” as one of what US President Donald Trump is calling the “Core 5” (C5) great powers he proposes replace the G7 to run the world on the basis of spheres of influence.

“Ukraine is entering a negotiated-outcome phase defined by capacity, not desire,” Jarabik said. “If guarantees are secured — a structured ceasefire above Istanbul 2022. If not, settlement may be imposed from a weaker position.”