Central Asia lies at the crossroads of major geopolitical and regional interests. Until recently, the countries of the region managed to balance between Russia, China, Turkey, and the collective West. However, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have been successful in their foreign policy manoeuvres, Kyrgyzstan is rapidly becoming an appendage of China.

Until recently, Kyrgyzstan viewed China with suspicion. In late 2018 and early 2019, several anti-China protests took place in Bishkek. These protests were aimed at opposing Chinese expansion and migration.

Historically, China was regarded as an adversary of both the Turks and Islam. The borders of the Tang Dynasty also included the territory of modern-day Kyrgyzstan.

Everything changed after Sadyr Japarov came to power in October 2020. As Japarov himself mentioned in an interview with a Russian publication, his ancestors lived in China. “During the tragic events of 1916, my great-grandfather, Japar, was forced to move to China with his family. My father was born there in 1932,” the President of Kyrgyzstan explained, dispelling rumours in Kyrgyz society that his loyalty to the “big neighbour” was influenced by his ancestry.

Debt as a tool of influence

The Kyrgyz Republic is already heavily dependent on China: 37% of the external debt is owed to China; 24% of foreign investments come from China; and trade with China now exceeds $22bn.

As of November 2024, Kyrgyzstan’s public debt stood at approximately $6.55bn from a total nominal GDP value of $12.5bn, of which $4.48bn is external debt. The key creditor here is China. According to the Ministry of Finance of the Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek owes China’s Exim Bank $1.65bn–$1.71bn, making up about 37% of the country’s total external debt.

In 2023, Kyrgyzstan spent around $359mn on servicing its external debt. Of that, $127mn went to payments to China. The situation repeated in 2024, with the largest tranche of $53.2mn again going to China’s Exim Bank.

In other words, every third dollar of Kyrgyzstan’s external debt is owed to China, which limits Bishkek’s financial flexibility. Of course, this debt was not incurred by Sadyr Japarov—it was inherited from his predecessors.

With total debt of around 40% of GDP, the Republic is not heavily indebted, but it has more debt that its peers. While paying off its debts to China with one hand, the Kyrgyz government runs the risk of falling into a “debt trap” if it is not prudent.

China’s economic expansion is visible in Kyrgyzstan even to the ordinary citizen. High-rise buildings, built with Chinese technologies and designs, are eroding Kyrgyz cities’ Central Asian distinctiveness, making them increasingly resemble Chinese megacities. Chinese companies dominate infrastructure projects, from roads to energy. Beijing confidently holds the top spot among foreign investors in Kyrgyzstan, surpassing even Russia.

The Kyrgyz authorities clearly have a bias for Chinese businesses, especially in the mining sector, one of the few natural resources the country has. Recently, one of the Telegram channels quoted the chairman of the Kyrgyz Association of Geologists and Mining Engineers, Duishenbek Kamchibekov complaining: "The only well-explored deposit of rare-earth elements in Kyrgyzstan is the Kutessai deposit in Kemin. And what did we do? Without a tender, we gave 70% to a Chinese company, leaving ourselves only 30%.”

The Chinese have already started developing the deposit, building a railway and surrounding infrastructure. Commentators complain Kazakh and Russian investors also have extensive experience in raw material extraction and processing but are under-represented in the Kyrgyz Republic.

Kyrgyzstan is increasingly drifting into the Chinese orbit. Financial obligations, growing trade turnover, and Chinese investments on onerous terms are turning Kyrgyzstan into a dependent partner rather than an equal player, say critics.