As the war in Ukraine grinds on, the Black Sea is emerging as the key theatre in Europe’s long-term security contest with Russia, according to political analyst Dimitar Bechev of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
“The balance of power in the Black Sea has shifted to Moscow’s disadvantage. Russia no longer enjoys the dominance it had after it seized Crimea in 2014,” Bechev wrote in a commentary published on June 19. “However, in the longer term, the power shift raises questions about the West’s containment strategy in the now-contested sea.”
Holding on to a piece of the Black Sea littoral is one of Ukraine’s strategic achievements thus far. The Ukrainian city of Kherson and Snake Island have been recaptured and Russian hopes of occupying the cities of Mykolayiv and Odesa have been thwarted.
While Russia continues missile and drone attacks on targets such as Odesa, the strategic balance in the Black Sea has shifted. “The Moskva, its flagship, was destroyed by Ukrainian missiles in April 2022. Kyiv has developed new unmanned sea-based weapons systems that have damaged critical infrastructure, notably the bridge across the Kerch Strait separating Crimea from the Russian mainland. In short, Russia is on the back foot, not about to cut off Ukraine’s access to the sea.”
After a blockade, Ukraine has regained its Black Sea access, an outcome with both strategic and commercial implications. “Odesa now ships out more grain than before the full-scale invasion,” Bechev noted. In 2024, exports from the port rose 15% in value and 30% in volume, Ukraine's main foreign exchange earner.
The Black Sea’s geopolitical significance, however, extends far beyond Ukraine. “It has become the fulcrum of Europe’s security order in three ways,” Bechev explained. “First, it is one of the key geographic arenas where the West is pulling its collective weight to check Russia… Second, the standoff highlights Turkey’s role as a swing actor… Third, it illustrates the uncertainty about US involvement in European security affairs.”
If there is a ceasefire, Russia will be eager to tip the balance of power in its favour. This is where Turkey comes in, says Bechev. It is both a Nato member and also friends with Moscow, but Ankara has gained from Ukraine’s successes and seen its trade balloon by ignoring sanctions on Russia.
Ankara will not be rushing to lift the ban on the passage of Russian warships it imposed in February 2022, in line with the 1936 Montreux Convention, which is venerated by the Turkish security establishment as a cornerstone of the state’s foreign policy. Turkey, which is hosting the ceasefire talks again, will make sure the Black Sea is a central part of any final agreement. Turkey has already gained from Ukraine’s success in curbing Russia’s maritime military might.
Turkey will be developing naval drones and other capabilities to maintain a favourable balance of power. The fall of the regime of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad has restored the Black Sea’s role as a focal point in the complex Russia-Turkey dynamic, too.
Turkey is developing its own naval power, with drones and expanding its military capacity as part of its ambitions to extend its power in the region, while refusing to reopen the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits to Russian warships without a final ceasefire deal in the Ukraine conflict.
However, after three years of war, a tentative maritime ceasefire appears to be in effect, after the de facto victory of Ukraine over Russia, despite the fact that Ukraine has no navy to speak of. “Ukraine refrains from striking Russian commercial traffic… Russians keep clear of vessels carrying Ukrainian commodities,” Bechev observed. However, any permanent truce will likely hinge on broader strategic calculations.
Nato remains the security guarantor for its Black Sea members – Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey – with multinational deployments already in place. The EU, meanwhile, adopted a new Black Sea strategy in May, aiming to bolster regional resilience. Yet “few would welcome the prospect of a watered-down Nato,” Bechev cautioned.
Ultimately, despite European and Turkish efforts to shape the region’s future, “what happens next will continue to be decided on the banks of the Potomac,” Bechev concluded. “The United States remains the lynchpin that is likeliest to decide the terms of a settlement.”