As protests continue to flare across Iran, the Azerbaijani government finds itself walking a political tightrope, balancing nationalist rhetoric with the need for regional stability. The unrest has drawn attention not only because of its proximity, but also due to the presence of millions of ethnic Azeris in Iran’s northwestern provinces—an enduring source of cultural and political sensitivity in Baku.

“The Iranian protests are a major event for Azerbaijan,” wrote Bashir Kitachaev, a political analyst, in a commentary for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Not just because they are taking place in a large neighbouring country, but also because of the millions of ethnic Azeris living in Iran’s northwestern provinces. Every time those regions are shaken by instability, nationalist circles perceive it as an opportunity for the ‘reunification’ of the Azerbaijani people.”

And the Azeris are just as unhappy with the Aliyev regime as the Iranians are with theirs.

“In many respects, Azerbaijan today is even less free than Iran, as confirmed by reports from human rights organizations such as Freedom House,” Kitachaev says. “There is still competition in Iranian politics between conservatives and reformists, elections are freer, and there is no cult of the ruling family like in Azerbaijan, among other things.”

While radical calls for the “liberation of historical lands” are becoming more prominent within nationalist discourse in Azerbaijan, the government has maintained a conspicuously cautious stance, afraid of inflaming social unrest that flares up occasionally in Azerbaijan.

“Baku’s position has remained markedly cautious,” Kitachaev observed. “It’s likely that the Azerbaijani leadership fears destabilisation along its southern borders and economic upheaval, and is unwilling to jeopardise the limited improvements made in relations with Tehran in recent years.”

Although Azerbaijani state media frequently invokes the idea of “southern Azerbaijan” to describe the Iranian provinces populated by ethnic Azeris, Kitachaev warned that this narrative is largely driven by domestic politics.

“The Azerbaijani authorities—who are typically quick to crack down on any rallies—have allowed a protest to be held outside the Iranian embassy in Baku under the slogan ‘Let Azerbaijan be united’,” he noted, but added that this image of oppressed kin “is not supported by the demands of Azeri Iranians themselves.”

“Certainly, protests are taking place there, too, but the complaints generally align with those of the rest of the nation: dissatisfaction with corruption, the economic crisis, and repression,” Kitachaev wrote. “Separatist slogans or calls for secession from Iran have not been observed.”

Despite some cultural and linguistic grievances, Azeri Iranians remain deeply integrated into Iran’s political system, Kitachaev pointed out. “Today, Iran’s Azeri community is widely represented within the political and security elites. Suffice to say that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Masoud Pezeshkian are ethnic Azeris.”

“Baku understands that notions of reunification are a utopian fantasy,” and that despite the public airing of nationalist sentiment, top officials have largely avoided commenting on the Iranian unrest. “The Azerbaijani leadership also understands that a conflict with its large neighbour promises no strategic benefits, while the consequences are unpredictable.”

Iran’s influence in the South Caucasus has diminished in recent years, but tensions have nonetheless surfaced. Tehran has accused Azerbaijan of allowing Israeli forces to use its territory for military operations, including during the Twelve-Day War last summer. These incidents, Kitachaev noted, are often accompanied by “diplomatic pressure, territorial claims, threats such as military exercises near the border, and arrests.”

Still, Baku appears determined to avoid escalation. “After each spike in tensions, Baku prefers to de-escalate the conflict and return dialogue to a pragmatic focus,” Kitachaev wrote. A major crisis in Iran, he argued, would not serve Azerbaijani interests: “The prospect of its southern neighbour turning into another Syria or Libya would deprive Azerbaijan of a vital trading partner.”

The risk is not only economic. A collapse in Iran could trigger refugee flows across the border and possibly embolden opposition voices within Azerbaijan itself. “If Azeris are protesting en masse against economic problems and arbitrary rule on the southern side of the border, why shouldn’t they do the same to the north of it?” Kitachaev asked.

“Accordingly, Azerbaijan is not seeking to use the Iranian protests to gain leverage,” he concluded. “Its strategy is one of biding its time, diplomatic restraint, and minimising risks, rather than staking its bets on nebulous nationalist or geopolitical gains.”