Europe’s rapid push into defence technology risks undermining its own security ambitions unless policymakers develop a coherent strategy defining how emerging technologies should reshape military power, sovereignty and accountability, according to a new analysis by Carnegie Europe.

As the European Union accelerates funding for artificial intelligence, drones, quantum computing and cyber capabilities, Brussels is moving quickly to build what officials describe as a modernised defence architecture shaped by technological innovation and lessons from Russian invasion of Ukraine. But analysts warn the bloc has yet to articulate what kind of conflicts it is preparing for or what strategic objectives the technological shift is meant to achieve.

“The EU is rapidly funding and organising a turn to defence tech without a sufficiently explicit blueprint,” wrote Raluca Csernatoni in a report published by Carnegie Europe.

She argued that the central question is no longer simply military spending or troop numbers, but how Europe integrates advanced technologies into defence while maintaining political control and democratic oversight.

“This shift goes beyond troops, platforms, and budgets,” the report said. Instead, security is increasingly organised around “artificial intelligence (AI), autonomy, quantum technologies, drones, space, cyber, connectivity, and data infrastructure.”

The European Commission is promoting a new defence innovation model built around speed, cheaper systems and rapid software-driven upgrades, increasingly involving startups and smaller firms rather than traditional defence contractors.

Yet Carnegie argued that Europe’s flagship defence initiatives, including investments in air defence, border surveillance and satellite resilience, remain fragmented.

“A shield is a posture, not a strategy,” Csernatoni wrote. “It explains how Europe might absorb pressure but says less about how it would hold the initiative in a future conflict.”

The report highlighted growing concern over Europe’s technological dependence on external providers, particularly the United States. European militaries remain heavily reliant on US-made platforms, GPS-linked systems and digital infrastructure.

“By some estimates, around 80% of the EU’s digital infrastructure is imported,” the report said, while many core AI systems used in Europe are developed outside the bloc. That dependence creates vulnerabilities, especially in an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment where allies may not always align.

“An ally on one file can become a competitor on the next. A supplier can impose conditions. A platform can change access,” the report said.

Carnegie did not advocate technological self-sufficiency, however, arguing that full autarky would be both unrealistic and economically damaging. Instead, Europe should focus on preserving strategic leverage and operational independence in critical areas such as computation, connectivity and space infrastructure.

“The point is leverage,” Csernatoni wrote. “Europe needs the capacity to continue operating and to make decisions when supply chains tighten, politics shift, or providers become unreliable.”

The report also warned that rapid integration of AI into military decision-making could compress human oversight and increase escalation risks. “Europe should not sleepwalk into running a military capable of machine-speed war,” Csernatoni said, before deciding “which forms of human judgement, oversight, international humanitarian law, and accountability it seeks to defend.”

The debate reflects broader tensions inside the EU, where some member states remain skeptical of commission-led defence initiatives and insist that core military capability decisions remain with national governments and Nato. Carnegie said the forthcoming European security strategy will be judged not by rhetoric or spending announcements alone, but by whether Brussels can define a coherent theory of power suited to modern warfare.