The US-Israeli war with Iran has done much more than redraw the oil distribution dynamics of the Middle East. It has exposed a hard truth for Asia: the region's power generation and economic future remains dangerously dependent on energy supplies flowing through one of the world's most vulnerable chokepoints.

Since the conflict erupted on February 28, Asian governments, utilities and investors have been forced into a rapid reassessment of how they generate electricity, source fuel and protect themselves from geopolitical shocks. The most immediate result of this has been a surge in spending on oil and gas imports. However, in knock-on effect the longer-term and better for the planet consequence of this is looking like a major acceleration of Asia's energy transition.

For much of the past decade, policymakers across the region believed they had found a workable formula under which coal use would gradually decline with natural gas stepping in to act as a transitional fuel. In the background, renewables would steadily expand until ready to take over.

The war in Iran has now thrown that model into disarray. The first shock came through supply disruption.

With Iran at the centre of the Gulf energy system any conflict involving Tehran carries implications for the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly a fifth of global oil and a substantial share of its LNG exports pass. As such, when hostilities intensified in the days and weeks after February 28, shipping risks increased and energy traders churned out pricing models based on the possibility of prolonged disruptions to Gulf exports.

In doing so, the first to feel the pain were Asian buyers who were immediately exposed.

Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India and a number of Southeast Asian economies rely heavily on imported LNG and crude oil. And while many utilities maintain long-term supply contracts, agreements only cover part of their annual requirements. Additional volumes are often purchased through spot markets, where prices react very quickly to geopolitical events.

As such, the result across Asia as American and Israeli bombs were dropping on Tehran was a scramble for cargoes that would not have to pass through the Strait of Hormuz.

Utilities in major Asian economies that had grown accustomed to relatively stable gas markets suddenly found themselves bidding aggressively against rivals for LNG shipments. In turn, spot LNG prices surged as traders sought to secure supplies before further escalation.

Oil markets experienced a similarly turbulent time with concerns over shipping insurance and tanker availability as well as transit risks adding further costs.

For Asian governments already struggling with inflation and fiscal pressures, the timing could hardly have been worse. Countries across South, East and Southeast Asia were forced to increase subsidies to prevent electricity prices from rising sharply. Others absorbed higher fuel procurement costs through state-owned utilities for weeks on end, effectively transferring the financial burden to public balance sheets.

It was a clear demonstration of just how vulnerable Asia remains to external supply shocks despite years of discussion about energy security.

Yet what happened as the war dragged on was perhaps even more significant.

Faced with soaring gas prices by those looking to profit from limited supplies, power producers across Asia turned back to a coal at a time many policymakers had hoped it was entering its final chapter.

The economics were and remain simple; existing coal-fired power stations are connected to the grid and capable of operating at higher utilisation rates at lower costs than LNG in times of geopolitical-induced shortage.

In Japan and South Korea, gas-fired generation declined noticeably as coal took up the slack. Similar trends were seen across Southeast Asia and parts of South Asia. Utilities across the continent that had previously planned to reduce coal use have now been forced to extend operating schedules or delay retirements.

Climate advocates of course were quick to criticise the shift, but from the perspective of grid operators, reliability trumped emissions targets.

And with the revival of coal comes a recurring tension in Asian energy policy. Governments, while publicly supporting decarbonisation are now faced with an immediate threat to energy security. Under such circumstances, guaranteed power supplies and affordability coupled to reliability wins. Climate concerns come second.

This does not mean the war has halted the green transition across Asia altogether, however. In face, quite the opposite is true.

If coal has been the short-term winner, renewable energy will more than likely emerge as the long-term beneficiary.

It is impossible to ‘block’ or precent solar farms from generating power in or around the Strait of Hormuz. Wind turbines do not need or depend on tanker traffic through the Gulf as overseen by authoritarian governments. Once renewable infrastructure is installed, it is essentially insulated from the geopolitical disruptions that regularly affect global oil and gas markets. And this is an understanding that has gained new political weight since February.

Across Asia, governments are now accelerating approvals for renewable projects and grid modernisation schemes. Battery storage investments are making headlines almost daily.

The tide has turned in Asia. Energy security is increasingly a part of the justification for clean-energy spending and fringe officials who previously framed renewables development and installation primarily as a climate policy requirement now present them as a national security measure.

To this end, more and more investors have taken notice with the uncertainty surrounding Gulf energy supplies pushing capital towards solar, wind and storage projects that offer predictable operating costs and reduced exposure to commodity price volatility like never before.

Battery systems, already much cheaper to buy into than in the last few years, have attracted growing interest as governments seek ways to integrate larger volumes of renewable generation while maintaining grid stability.

The war has also strengthened the case for electrification. Reducing governmental dependence on imported oil and gas through electric vehicle use, heat pumps and up to date modernised power systems is no longer viewed solely as an environmental objective. Tens of millions, if not more, across Asia are seeing this shift as a domestic necessity to avoid any replication of the rising prices and economic uncertainty of late.

This shift does not mean fossil fuels will disappear from Asia's energy mix any time soon though. The region's energy demand continues to grow rapidly, and many developing economies still lack the infrastructure needed to rely heavily on renewable generation alone. But that is changing and the time will come when renewables are the go to and spats between presidents and prime ministers will not affect the lives of people half a world away.

Before the war, debates about energy policy often focused on balancing cost against climate commitments. Since February, energy security has moved to the top of the agenda and governments worldwide, Asia included, are asking not only what fuel is cheapest, but what fuel is safest.

As such, the immediate legacy of this conflict may be higher fuel bills, stronger coal demand and stretched government budgets. Yet its lasting impact will one day prove to be be a more profound transformation of Asia's power sector.