Chinese President Xi Jinping's latest summit with Vladimir Putin produced few headline-grabbing agreements. The biggest missing deal was an agreement to build the Power of Siberia 2 (POS2) gas pipeline. But analysts argue the visit revealed something potentially more significant: Beijing is quietly preparing for a post-Putin Russia while steadily embedding its relationship with Russia more deeply into the institutions and elites that will outlast him, analysts at the China-Russia Report said in a note.

The lack of major commercial announcements during Putin's May visit to Beijing contrasted with the increasingly expansive language emerging from Chinese state media and official statements on their “no limits” partnership. Rather than focusing on new deals, Beijing repeatedly stressed the long-term and institutional nature of the partnership, signalling what analysts describe as a deliberate effort to "de-personalise" ties with Moscow.

"Vladimir Putin's recent visit to Beijing adds to the large and growing body of evidence suggesting that Xi Jinping and the CCP are institutionalising ties with Moscow in anticipation of a power transition," wrote Joseph Webster, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and editor of the independent China-Russia Report. "While Beijing does not necessarily anticipate a transition, it continues to de-personalize ties with Putin and broaden the scope of its engagement with Russian society, especially among Russian elites."

The approach reflects Beijing's desire to insulate one of its most important strategic partnerships from the uncertainties surrounding Russia's ageing leadership. At 73, Putin remains firmly in control, but Chinese policymakers increasingly appear to be building relationships that will survive any eventual succession.

The change comes after four years of institutional building amongst the fast expanding BRICS bloc that is setting Global Emerging Markets Institutions (GEMIs) that separate from the Western dominant system – a. process that has been catalysed by the wars in Ukraine and Iran as well the advent of the Trump administration’s transactional world view. This has also led to the CRINK alliance (China, Russia, Iran and North Korea), a pragmatic economic-military alliance based on the overlapping national interests of an emerging asymmetrical diplomacy where significant frictions between the partners remain. As IntelliNews reported, the world is entering a post Pax Americana era where the interregnum is already underway that are usually both more fractious and multipolar than the empire-eras. Putin and Xi spelled out their vision for this sort of world in a joint 8,000 word essay last year.

Investing in Russia, not just Putin

The most visible sign of that strategy has been an expansion of people-to-people ties. According to Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, a largely overlooked visa agreement has dramatically increased exchanges between the two countries.

"During Putin's last visit to Beijing in September 2025, Xi unexpectedly announced that for one year, Russians would be able to visit China without a visa for up to thirty days. Since Russia adheres to the principle of reciprocity in visa matters, the Kremlin responded in kind. A record two million Russians visited China last year—most of them in the last four months of the year once the visa waiver had been announced—and the visa-free regime is now being extended until the end of 2027."

The rapid expansion of travel comes alongside growing educational exchanges, tourism, cultural cooperation and business contacts that Beijing increasingly sees as a way to cultivate future Russian political, economic and technological elites via soft power ties.

Chinese officials have devoted unusual attention to education. Multiple official statements following the summit described education as a strategic pillar of bilateral relations, while 2026 has been designated a bilateral "Year of Education."

Also little remarked is Russia has also been striving to depersonalise its foreign policy and build up stronger institutional and cultural ties for more than a decade now, according to Dmitri Trenin, a member of Russia's Foreign and Defence Policy Council. In the 1990s the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was prone to back individual presidents and prime ministers, but over the last decade it has focused more on building up more orthodox ministry to ministry ties.

A recent example has been the change of guard in Armenia after now Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was elected following the Velvet Revolution in 2018. Campaigning on liberal values and an end to corruption, Pashinyan was brought to power by yet another colour revolution and is not a natural ally of the Kremlin. Yet, Putin and Pashinyan met and signed off on a raft of economic and energy deals and enjoyed cordial relations until the Azerbaijan takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in an “anti-terrorist operation” in September 2023 strained relations to breaking point.

Few China deals, many signals

Despite heightened expectations, Putin left Beijing without several of the agreements observers had anticipated. There was no announcement on the long-delayed Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline, which would significantly increase Russian gas exports to China, nor was there agreement on expanding the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline network supplying northern China.

Instead, Chinese officials repeatedly emphasised a phrase rarely seen in previous summit communiqués roughly translated as "steady progress carries you the distance" or "advancing steadily for the long term." The phrase appeared throughout official coverage in People's Daily, Global Times and statements from China's Foreign Ministry.

Another editorial described the relationship as: "The continuously deepening comprehensive strategic cooperation between China and Russia has injected surging momentum into the development of their respective countries, the well-being of their people, and the peace and stability of the world today."

"Permanent good-neighbourliness and friendship, comprehensive strategic cooperation, and mutually beneficial cooperation—these three essential characteristics act like three pillars, supporting the steady and sustainable development of bilateral relations," it continued.

The repeated emphasis was on long-term development rather than short-term commercial gains. Webster argues this reflected both the absence of tangible deliverables and Beijing's broader effort to institutionalise the relationship.

The emphasis on development rather than ideology is the essence of what IntelliNews has dubbed asymmetrical diplomacy: unlike in the West, where the focus is on “shared values”, China and Russia both emphasise the principle of “strict non-interference in domestic affairs.” A Global South country can be as brutal as it wants and the other members of the BRICS bloc will never directly condemn it or pressure it to conform to an externally applied set of norms. Some analysts have scoffed at the idea of a coordinated BRICS that could rival the transatlantic alliance for its inability to act in unison. But this is to misunderstand the nature of the emerging geopolitical order: it is more of a dynamic network of interlocking interests that will constantly change making the idea of binary rivalries meaningless. Russia and China’s relations are already demonstrating this dichotomy of overlapping and clashing interests and managing these relations will be at the core of diplomacy going forward.

China's interests increasingly diverge

The asymmetrical diplomatic set up of overlapping, but not matching, interests means that friction amongst the Global South bloc is inevitable. But those frictions are also hard baked into the structures that they are trying to build.

The Beijing summit highlighted the underlying reality that is often overlooked amid declarations of the "no limits" partnership: China and Russia increasingly have different economic interests.

Official Chinese statements repeatedly referred to promoting "their respective national development" rather than identical strategic goals.

"As permanent members of the UN Security Council and major world powers, China and Russia should take a long-term strategic view, promote their respective national development and revitalisation through higher-quality comprehensive strategic cooperation, and promote the building of a more just and reasonable global governance system," Xi said.

Webster argues the wording is deliberate. China remains the world's largest energy importer, while Russia is among the world's largest exporters. The raw materials vs massive consumer market is amongst the world’s best synergies and the bedrock of their overlapping mutual cooperation.

The conflict in the Gulf imposed direct economic costs on China through higher oil and gas prices while simultaneously boosting Russian export revenues. But rather than concealing these differences, Chinese messaging increasingly acknowledges both countries' "respective and common interests" as Russia boosted oil exports to China.

Although public announcements focused heavily on education and cultural exchanges, analysts believe security cooperation is also expanding rapidly behind closed doors. As IntelliNews reported, the Iran war has illustrated that the CRINK military cooperation is already much more advanced than analysts first thought. China, Russia and North Korea all shared key military technology and satellite intelligence with Tehran in just the last year that has allowed it to fight a hugely effective asymmetrical war against what is supposed to be the most powerful military on the planet.

But in keeping with the principle of non-interference, the CRINK cooperation will never become a formal alliance and indeed both governments are extremely reluctant to even discuss their economic cooperation let alone the sharing of dual use technology.

As with the Western support of Ukraine, Russia and China have supported Iran to ensure that Iran is not defeated, but will never intervene directly in the conflict nor overtly supply Iran with materiel. Nevertheless, military collaboration has already expanded dramatically since 2022 through joint naval patrols, strategic bomber flights and increasingly sophisticated military exercises.

Building institutions for the long term

Western commentators have derided Russia as a “petrol station masquerading as a country,” in the past, and more recently as “China’s raw materials warehouse.” However, the relationship between Beijing and Moscow is deepening and Russia diplomatic pushes into Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America are starting to pay dividends as relations between the Global South bloc continue to deepen.

That suits Beijing fine. Chinese state media consistently framed the relationship with Russia as one designed to endure regardless of political leadership. An English-language People's Daily commentary noted: "Their in-depth, friendly and fruitful talks, lasting more than three hours in total, reinforced a shared commitment to advancing the long-term, sound, steady and high-quality development of China-Russia ties, a strategic choice grounded in the fundamental interests of both countries and in line with broader global trends."

Russia has become indispensable to Beijing as a supplier of discounted energy, military technology, and critical raw materials. But Beijing values as much Moscow’s diplomatic support in challenging the Western-led “unipolar” order and the US hegemony. Chinese policymakers appear increasingly conscious that Putin, now in his third decade in power, will not lead Russia indefinitely, but the threat of an increasingly belligerent America is not going anywhere.

Rather than betting solely on one man, Beijing is quietly investing in the long-term as its rise will continue for decades. China is investing in institutions, elites and social networks that will shape its Russia relations long after Putin retires or dies.