Former prime minister Viktor Orban was re-elected as chairman of Fidesz at the party’s 32nd congress in Budapest on June 13, despite his party’s crushing defeat in the April 12 election. The veteran leader, who was the only candidate for the post, was elected for a one-year term in a secret ballot, with 729 votes out of 737 valid votes, state news agency MTI reports.
The event was markedly more restrained than the grand pre-election congresses of the past, highlighting the party's adjustment to life after its electoral defeat.
In a major electoral shock, the Tisza Party secured a sweeping victory in April, winning 141 of the 199 parliamentary seats and achieving a stable supermajority.
Led by former Fidesz insider Peter Magyar, the party received a record 3.3mn votes, with turnout reaching a historic 79%. Fidesz, by contrast, saw its parliamentary representation fall dramatically from 135 seats to 53. The result reflects seismic changes in Hungarian politics.
The defeat has been linked to mounting voter fatigue after 16 years of Fidesz governance, widespread concerns over corruption allegations, and criticism of increasingly centralised decision-making and the government’s pro-Russian stance. The opposition’s stronger digital campaign and greater appeal to younger voters also proved decisive, alongside economic pressures and ongoing tensions with the European Union that weighed on public sentiment. Fidesz’s fear-mongering campaign also proved inefficient due to the cost-of-living crisis.
Orban set the stage with a lengthy essay earlier in the day, outlining his interpretation of Fidesz's defeat in the April election, arguing that a combination of foreign and domestic factors contributed to the party's loss, while showing no sign of self-reflection.
The outcome of the congress signals continuity rather than strategic renewal for the party, forced into opposition after four supermajority wins between 2010 and 2022. Speakers at the event largely maintained the party's familiar political messaging, focusing on sovereignty, opposition to Brussels and criticism of the new government.
Orban said his government had spent the past 16 years building a sovereign political, economic and cultural system aimed at reducing Hungary's dependence on external actors and strengthening national self-determination.
Fidesz had faced constant opposition from what he described as four powerful external actors, including Brussels, the network associated with financier George Soros, Ukraine, multinational corporations and previous US Democratic administrations. He characterised these confrontations as part of a broader freedom fight to defend Hungary’s sovereignty.
He outlined ten factors which contributed to Fidesz’s election defeat. He argued that the party’s campaign message lacked appeal and failed to recognise the opposition’s early advantage, resulting in a flawed strategy. Turnout expectations were miscalculated, and the opposition proved more effective in mobilisation.
He pointed to an inability to respond to corruption allegations, what he described as a coordinated hate campaign, and a disastrous performance in the digital space, where Fidesz lost the battle for younger voters. Orban said this generational shift represented a personal failure as well.
He further claimed that algorithms favoured his opponent and that the opposition had successfully neutralised government messaging on the war, which, besides the stop of EU funds, constrained economic growth. He added, however, that unlike the opposition, Fidesz had not made unrealistic social and economic promises.
Orban also suggested that Fidesz’s core political message had lost its appeal. While the party campaigned on protecting past achievements, maintaining security and continuing its confrontational stance towards Brussels, voters increasingly prioritised economic improvement and access to EU funding.
Hungary under the new government could face increased influence from Brussels and a weakening of conservative institutions, he warned, adding that the idea of a sovereign Hungary would survive regardless of political developments
The congress also elected four vice-presidents, and delegates unanimously accepted the report of the national caucus in an open vote, and with a single nay vote, they also accepted the proposal of the party leadership.
The congress also adopted the party's new statute, which includes internal reforms aimed at strengthening county-level party structures as Fidesz adjusts to its new role in opposition.
Delegates also adopted a political resolution rejecting the EU’s migration pact and protesting the "violent removal of democratically elected public officials.
After his re-election, Orban defiantly said: "I never back up, I am an insurgent; I am only interested in national politics, I will not be tempted by money, European positions, or international praise." He said in the coming year he would work to "hand down Fidesz to the young generation as an organised and modern party with chances of winning."
The former prime minister said he had always considered it a personal mission to build a sovereign Hungary and considered the Fidesz-Christian Democrat alliance as a community whose members would "sacrifice even decades of their lives for that goal". Orban said he had "no illusions" concerning the incumbent government, adding that "the liberals now having power will open the gates, foreigners will come and ransack the country".
Fidesz maintained its existing political narrative centred on sovereignty, opposition to Brussels and criticism of the Tisza government, while showing little sign of reassessing the policies or political style that contributed to its electoral defeat.
Critical voices were few and far between, and only a handful of delegates openly reflected on the causes of the electoral setback. One of them was Istvan Stump, who served as the Minister in charge of the Prime Minister's Office in the first Orban government from 1998 to 2002.
Stumpf delivered a rare and unusually blunt internal critique, arguing that the "Orban era" and the governance model built around it had effectively collapsed. He said the system lost its moral and intellectual leadership after 2022, as internal feedback mechanisms and space for criticism disappeared and a clientelist structure took hold.
He attributed the electoral defeat to deeper structural problems rather than a single campaign failure, including a shift away from civic, value-based politics toward self-interest and "showmanship," as well as increasing alienation of younger voters and the erosion of local political ties. He also criticised the campaign for being overly simplistic and counterproductive.
There were a few voices in Fidesz's intellectual circles who said the congress offered little substantive debate and failed to provide meaningful explanations for the party’s electoral defeat, and that it exposed the party’s weakened position.
This chimes with the view of most independent analysts, who argued that Fidesz faced a difficult choice after its election defeat. Replacing Orban could have triggered internal divisions, as the party has become closely identified with its longtime leader.
Keeping Orbán in place, Fidesz remains tied to its 16-year record in government, allowing the Tisza Party to continually associate it with the legacy of the previous administration.
Political analyst Szabolcs Dull says this allows Peter Magyar to present himself as a symbol of renewal, while framing Fidesz as the embodiment of the political past. He adds that this dynamic is likely to keep the political contest centred on Orban personally, rather than on a new opposition figure who would still need time to establish nationwide recognition.
Despite personnel changes and a few organisational reforms, the congress showed little evidence that Fidesz has fundamentally reassessed the reasons behind its electoral defeat or altered its core political strategy, he argued.