Afghanistan’s Taliban regime has carried out deep cuts to the country’s security forces – a United Nations monitoring report that reveals the move is of particular concern given that at least five Chinese workers were recently killed by assailants said to have crossed into Tajikistan from Afghan border lands.

Alarm bells might also ring that much louder given that the UN Security Council Committee analysis filed in December shows that “out of the more than 4,000 commanders and rank-and-file officers removed nationwide [by the Taliban], approximately 1,000 were removed from Badakhshan Province alone. It was through Badakhshan’s porous border with the Central Asian country that the gunmen thought to have killed the Chinese mine company and road construction employees were said to have entered Tajikistan.

The report partly attributes the Taliban’s cuts to security contingents as caused by Afghanistan’s “challenging economic situation” resulting in a “struggle to pay salaries, which are especially consequential within the security sector”.

Says the report: “The [Taliban] leadership in Kandahar has pushed, often against the will of those in Kabul, for a downsizing within the de facto Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior, as well as the General Directorate of Intelligence.

“It is notable that following [Taliban Supreme Leader of Afghanistan, Mullah] Hibatullah [Akhundzada]’s order on 13 April for a 20 per cent reduction in security forces due to budgetary constraints, out of the more than 4,000 commanders and rank-and-file officers removed nationwide, approximately 1,000 were removed from Badakhshan Province alone. After Badakhshan, the highest proportion of redundancies occurred in other northern provinces, Kapisa, Parwan and Takhar, all of which are home to larger numbers of ethnic Tajik and Uzbek Taliban.”

Spike in armed clashes

Tajik authorities have this year observed a spike in the number of armed clashes with Afghan drug traffickers.

On December 27, AFP reported Taliban authorities as saying that they were working with Tajikistan to investigate a border clash earlier in the week that killed five people, including two Tajik guards.

Two days earlier Tajikistan’s national security committee said that three members of a "terrorist" group crossed into Tajik territory "illegally" in Khatlon province. Security forces killed the trio, but two border guards also died in the clash, it added.

Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi was cited as saying that "we have started serious investigations into the recent 'incidents' on Tajik soil. I spoke to the foreign minister of Tajikistan, and we are working together to prevent such incidents."

AFP also quoted him as remarking: "We are worried that some malicious circles want to destroy the relations between the two neighbouring countries."

Tajikistan and Afghanistan have a mountainous border that stretches around 1,350 kilometres (839 miles).

The Amu Darya and Panj rivers largely make up the border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan (Source: Shannon1, cc-by-sa 4.0).

The UN report stated that militant group Jamaat Ansarullah "has fighters spread across different regions of Afghanistan", with its primary goal "to destabilise the situation in Tajikistan."

Dushanbe is also concerned over the presence in Afghanistan of members of Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP, or ISIS-K). The group attempts to radicalise Tajik and other Central Asian nationals who can then be assigned to international terrorist attacks.

UN monitoring describes the existence of around 20 terrorist groups in Afghanistan, though the Taliban denies that is the case. The Taliban’s denials are not credible, according to the UN analysis.

Tajikistan, meanwhile, has rejected reports that following the deadly attacks on Chinese workers, it requested security assistance from Russia to help secure its border with Afghanistan. Moscow has a military base in Tajikistan, in fact its biggest outside Russia.

Not clear who is responsible

Looking at who might be responsible for the cross-border attacks that resulted in the death of the Chinese nationals, Temur Umarov, an analyst at Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, wrote in a December 19 commentary: “It’s not entirely clear who is responsible. Hypothetically, it could be the Eastern Turkestan Islamist Movement (which China designates as a terrorist organization), or Afghanistan’s Islamic State-Khorasan Province. However, neither group has claimed responsibility.

“It’s also possible the Taliban carried them out to annoy unfriendly Tajikistan by trying to compromise the latter’s relationship with Beijing. However, it’s unlikely the Taliban would risk its own relationship with China—almost the only country that has the desire and capacity to invest in Afghanistan.

“The most likely explanation, therefore, is that the attacks were not coordinated by one actor. After all, the Taliban do not have full control of northern Afghanistan, and much of the process of government is outsourced to warlords. When local, cross-border agreements break down, it’s easy to imagine injured parties reaching for their weapons. This is what happened in August when Taliban and Tajik border guards in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan region clashed over changes to the course of the Panj River (marking the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border).

“Nor is it surprising that Chinese facilities have been attacked. Almost all the infrastructure—as well as mining operations—in remote parts of Tajikistan is built and run by Chinese companies. In other words, there are few targets in this part of the world unconnected to China.”

Under the Taliban who returned to power in August 2021, Afghanistan’s borders have, according to Umarov, generally remained relatively calm—except for the border with Tajikistan.

In the first half of 2025 alone, there were more than 10 border incidents, said the analyst.

He added: “If these attacks had happened immediately after the Taliban came to power four years ago, it would have been more politically convenient for Dushanbe: it would have proved that the Tajik government’s hostile attitude to the Taliban was justified. But the circumstances are different now, and the escalation comes amid attempts by Dushanbe to improve relations with Kabul.

“The most important difference [when it comes to Central Asian security] is the ongoing war in Ukraine, which has altered Moscow’s priorities. Russia has concentrated almost all its military force in Ukraine, including men from the 201st military base in Tajikistan (according to media reports, the number of soldiers stationed at the base has fallen by at least a fifth).

“In addition, this year, India gave up its Ayni air base in Tajikistan after New Delhi decided a presence in Central Asia was not a strategic priority. Tajikistan tried to compensate for India’s exit by deepening its cooperation with Pakistan and Iran—but has only been partially successful.”

Moscow’s “few good options”

If Tajikistan was to request Russian assistance in guarding its border with Afghanistan, Moscow, according to Umarov, would have few good options: “On the one hand, an appeal for Russian help to protect Chinese infrastructure (despite the fact that China has two police outposts in Tajikistan) highlights Moscow’s continuing influence in the region. On the other, the deployment of a Russian military force would entail serious risks.

“If Russian soldiers were sent to the border and proved unable to stop the attacks, it would fuel the narrative that Russia has been weakened by the Ukraine war. And if Russian soldiers were killed, it would put Moscow in a bind—given that it has recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, and called on other countries to do the same.

“Nor should one forget about Russia’s domestic situation. Sending soldiers to Tajikistan while the fighting continues in Ukraine might be seen by many inside Russia as a waste of resources—even treachery. Ultra-patriotic groups regularly accuse the Russian leadership of wasting money, time, and resources on ‘ungrateful allies,’ and military aid for Tajikistan—particularly given the anti-migrant rhetoric that is currently extremely common in Russia—would risk sparking opposition.

“Consequently, Moscow will likely try to limit its involvement. It’s possible some soldiers from the 201st base will be sent to a secure and peaceful part of the border. Or, to save face, Russia might conduct some joint military exercises with Tajikistan.

“What the Kremlin will certainly seek to avoid is involving any troops in joint patrols on dangerous stretches of the border. Such patrols would allow Dushanbe to retain its influence in these areas—including over local economic activity—while shifting all the financial burden for the current situation, as well as the considerable military and political risks, onto Russia’s shoulders.”