Like the protests in Ukraine's Maidan Square and those in neighbouring West Asian states, this latest round of protests in Iran is being driven by economic and political discontent, with a growing number of analysts and pundits in the West drawing analogies to previous protest movements. 

When people cannot afford to buy bread, they lose their fear of bullets. The protests sweeping the country are teetering between the overthrow of theocracy or a violent crackdown that would leave hundreds dead, Britain's Fraser Nelson said in a Substack post this week.

The Iranian rial has been in freefall, losing nearly half its value over 2025. Inflation is running at least 40%, and food prices are up 80%. This makes businesses unviable, with shopkeepers and producers refusing to sell their products, fearing losses.

Every major protest in Iran tends to be crushed by overwhelming force and as part of his Middle East peace strategy US President Donald Trump has stepped into the fray declaring: “If Iran shoots and violently kills peaceful protesters, which is their custom, the United States of America will come to their rescue. We are locked and loaded and ready to go.”

The violence is already escalating. While the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has the resources to crush protests in the large cities, it does not in the smaller ones where local governors are taking matters into their own hands in direct contravention of calls for calm from the presidency.  

The regime’s historic knee-jerk reaction is to turn to violence, as has been shown in previous rounds of challenge to the system. In November 2019, when demonstrations erupted over a fuel price hike, the Rouhani administration imposed a total internet blackout and struck back, leading to hundreds of deaths.

“The clerics claim that Islam itself is under threat, in the hope of rallying religious groups who do not support Khamenei. No Islamic Republic, it says, no Islam,” says Nelson.

But repression is their standard response and an era of popular consent is over. Khamenei is 86; the average Iranian is 33. This is a sophisticated, educated country rolling in natural resources suffering the worst food inflation in the world next to South Sudan. All because their leaders won’t give up their nuclear ambition, leading to sanctions, says Nelson.

A gaping disconnect has opened up between the mullahs and the people they rule. The theocracy controls the economy and society. Iran’s military, judiciary and parliament are all dominated by hardliners whose worldview is now very different to the well-educated people they govern who want to see the country open up.

Recent polls suggest that Iranians have had enough of the ‘death to Israel’ rhetoric and the uranium enrichment agenda that has brought down the crushing sanctions. A post-Israel-war survey found 58% of Iranians blamed Khamenei for the June war damages; 69% said Iran should give up calling for Israel’s destruction.

Partly thanks to the internet, which has put the rest of the world on display, the social mores have shifted. The cleric-led system is not keeping up. Increasingly the people resent the economic austerity and repression that underpin domestic security, as they can now see directly how the rest of the world lives.

This desire for change was underscored by the 2022 mass protests following the death of Mahsa Amini, a young woman who was arrested and beaten to death by the morality police for incorrectly wearing her hijab. So far, the 2026 protests have not been the same size in terms of numbers of people protesting, according to reports on the ground; however, they have been more widespread, with different deciles protesting over the cost of living and the poor state of affairs. Most importantly, the 2026 protests have seen growing numbers of bazaar merchants come out on the streets, which is different to the 2022 protests.   

The collapse of the rial was the spark that set the touchpaper on fire. Years of pent-up frustrations have now exploded onto the street, initially by mobile phone retailers in the condemned Aladdin Passage, the historic home of cell phones. 

This time, protests are nationwide and, like in Ukraine, they are beginning to grow to a size where the security forces are hesitant to tackle them, allowing the sporadic crowds to vent their frustrations at the orders of the country's President Pezeshkian. Yet despite his order not to beat up and shoot protesters, more than three dozen have died, and over a thousand people have been arrested, according to human rights groups. 

In the small town of Lordegan, protesters stormed the governor’s office and set fire to the judiciary building and the Foundation of Martyrs: a direct rejection of the regime’s ideological apparatus.

In Far’s town of Azna, protesters overran a police station. In Fasa, crowds broke down the doors of the governorate despite live fire from security forces and military helicopters circling overhead. Students at Beheshti University resisted midnight raids on their dormitories, Nelson reports.

And in a reversal of the 1979 revolution this time round the protestors are openly chanting: “Long live the shah.” And the protestors know they are taking their lives in their hands: more than 1,500 people were killed during the three days of protest in 2019.

Following protests in 2022 dozens of young men were hanged from cranes after show trials and “confessions” extracted under torture. The hangings were broadcast on state television. Executions in Iran have doubled in 2025 compared to 2024, the highest rate in nearly 40 years. Protesting in Iran means accepting the possibility of being arrested and executed. There are reports that the regime has stayed shooting people in Fooladshahr, Isfahan, which would mean calling Trump’s bluff.

The regime is scaling up its response as control slowly slips through its fingers. Earlier this week video out of Tehran showed commuters using the metro running to exits after the police fired tear gas grenades in the underground stations. Water cannons have been deployed in sub-zero temperatures, amid Iran’s worst drought in 40 years. And reports of live ammunition use are increasing daily.

The more liberal Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has been attempting to diffuse the growing tensions and has tried to engage the protestors in dialogue. He appeared on television this week, admitting the government’s paralysis: “If people are dissatisfied, it is our fault. Do not look for America or others to blame. The responsibility lies with us.” He accepted the resignation of the central bank governor, who has become a fall guy for the inflation spike, but so far, this soft-handed approach has failed to quell the unrest.

The regime’s response has been made more difficult following the 12-day war with Israel. Hossein Salami, commander of the Revolutionary Guards, and Mohammad Bagheri, chief of staff, were killed in Israeli strikes, weakening the leadership of the IRGC.

Khamenei recently appointed Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi as IRGC deputy commander, his second major appointment in two months, reflecting chaos at the top, says Nelson. The lack of a knee-jerk violent crackdown suggests there are disputes amongst the elite over how to respond to the escalating demonstrations.

Many have highlighted the role of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, who lives in exile but has taken to social media to promote a change in regime and offer himself as a new leader. He visited Israel in April 2023 and met Benjamin Netanyahu, the first prominent Iranian to do so publicly.

For many, the return of the monarchy has become an immediate solution to the problem of how to change the leadership. As an exile, Pahlavi already has relations with the Western powers and should be able to rapidly negotiate a partial lifting of sanctions in a similar way that the new President, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has brought about a sea-change in Syria’s relations with the West and immediate sanctions relief.

But the popularity of the monarchy picture is contested. A Kurdish activist reported that regime agents infiltrate protests and chant in favour of Pahlavi, to discredit the movement and create discord, Nelson reports.

The Biden administration took a policy of containment and engagement that went nowhere. Trump has adopted an altogether more aggressive foreign policy – especially against Iran and Venezuela – of pressure and destabilisation: maximum sanctions, support for Israeli strikes, direct action against Iranian assets abroad.

It remains to be seen if Trump can deliver tangible long-term results from his transactional approach. Moscow and Beijing are allies with both Iran and Venezuela, but both are powerless to seriously affect the outcomes of these showdowns with Washington. They can at best offer solidarity and facility sanction-busting oil exports. However, Trump is specifically targeting Iran’s oil exports to China and has told the new Rodrigues government to cut ties with both Moscow and Beijing or face renewed military strikes and even harsher sanctions.