Last week, Georgians marked 365 days of non-stop protests in Tbilisi. What began as resistance to the “foreign agents” law has become a daily referendum on the country’s political direction. During the same year, the government halted EU accession talks, tightened rules on public assembly and increased reliance on arrests, fines and police pressure to deter dissent.

These street confrontations are only the visible edge of a deeper crisis. Georgia’s justice system is steadily losing the independence that once made democratic pluralism possible. The courts, prosecutors and oversight bodies remain in place, yet the principles that animate them are being hollowed out.

For years, Georgia was treated as a modest post-Soviet success. Elections were competitive, the judiciary improved incrementally and EU membership felt like a genuine prospect. That progress stalled long before the October elections, but the vote exposed the scale of decline. International observers noted secrecy breaches, procedural inconsistencies and voter intimidation. The result left little doubt that Georgia’s institutions were drifting towards systematic capture.

At the centre of this shift stands Bidzina Ivanishvili, the billionaire who dominates political life despite formally stepping down as prime minister in 2013. His influence runs through a cluster of loyal judges who control the High Council of Justice and through a prosecution service that appears more eager to pursue political opponents than genuine wrongdoing. Opposition figures now face investigations and criminal charges that raise obvious concerns about fair trial rights.

The most striking example of this trend is Ivanishvili’s promise of a “Georgian Nuremberg Process” targeting officials from the United National Movement for their role in the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. The historical analogy is chosen for impact rather than accuracy. The EU-backed Tagliavini report on the conflict declined to assign overall blame, noting violations by both Georgia and Russia. A serious legal process would confront that complexity. Ivanishvili’s proposal sidesteps it entirely.

The politics of the moment reveal the intent. The pledge of wartime trials was rolled out during the election campaign and paired with claims that a “global war party” was working to drag Georgia into conflict with Russia. Billboards that contrasted bombed Ukrainian streets with peaceful Georgian ones left little ambiguity: support Georgian Dream or risk catastrophe.

Georgia’s record supports scepticism. The country has long generated politically tinged prosecutions and extradition requests. In 2016, a British court rejected the extradition of former defence minister David Kezerashvili after concluding the request was politically driven. In 2024, the European Court of Human Rights identified serious breaches of fair trial guarantees. Then, in February 2025, the Brussels Court of Appeal delivered a comprehensive refusal of another extradition request. Judges cited allegations of torture, convictions in absentia without meaningful retrial guarantees and official assurances contradicted by Georgia’s own Public Defender. A French court later reached the same conclusion.

Such decisions matter. Extradition relies on trust: the belief that another country’s courts can dispense justice rather than political punishment. When EU judges repeatedly find risks of torture or procedural injustice, they are signalling not only concern for individual defendants but also a broader judgement about the system’s reliability.

The international response has been uneven. Washington has imposed sanctions on several Georgian officials, though not on Ivanishvili. Brussels is caught between supporting a population that remains overwhelmingly pro-EU and challenging a government that no longer behaves like an EU candidate. Viktor Orbán’s open endorsement of Georgian Dream has further complicated the European position.

Georgia’s trajectory is not simply a local political conflict. It is a demonstration of how quickly legal systems can be reshaped when a single figure accumulates enough political and economic leverage. Ivanishvili’s “Nuremberg Process” is a vivid illustration of justice in name — politics in practice. Once courts and prosecutors begin to function as instruments of power, the rule of law becomes ceremonial.

The Georgians who have filled the streets for a year understand what is at risk. Europe should be equally clear-sighted. Supporting Georgia now requires more than expressions of concern. It demands a defence of the legal principles that allow democratic societies to function.

Ben Keith is a barrister at 5 St Andrew’s Hill specialising in human rights and extradition.

Jean-Christophe De Block is a Belgian criminal and international lawyer who represented the defendant in the Brussels extradition case and before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).