The return to Kyrgyzstan of fired national security chief Kamchybek Tashiyev in the past week begs the question of whether his rivalry with President Sadyr Japarov will turn into an open confrontation with public hostility, the mobilisation of supporters and a political struggle for all to see.

On March 20, Tashiyev – previously regarded as a co-ruler in a power tandem with Japarov, but who in early February was suddenly fired by the president while he was in Germany for a medical appointment – attended the main investigations department of the interior ministry where he was questioned over allegations raised by the state tax service of extensive corruption at national oil company Kyrgyzneftegaz conducted by members of the Tashiyev family.

On the same day, after attending an Eid al-Fitr prayer at a Bishkek mosque, Tashiyev, in brief comments made to Region TV, said: “For the sake of Allah Almighty, in honour of today's Eid prayer, I ask forgiveness from every Muslim if I have offended anyone or treated someone incorrectly.

“I have also forgiven those who spread various lies, rumours and said various nonsense during the fasting period, for the sake of the Eid prayer. May they no longer commit such bad deeds. May they not speak bad words or state false information!"

Japarov has mounted a wide-ranging purge of Tashiyev’s allies across government, parliament, the GKNB internal security service, municipal authorities and other areas including the central bank since sacking his former ally.

"We remain friends. But he will not return to government service. He needs to rest and take care of his health," Japarov said after the dismissal.

Some analysts, however, doubt that Tashiyev will stay out of politics. In fact, some see him organising for a run at taking the presidency in the next election, scheduled for January next year. Japarov is expected to pursue re-election in the poll.

As regards his difficulties with the Kyrgyzneftegaz investigation, political scientist Emil Jurayev was on March 20 reported by Azattyk as saying: “Tashiyev will most likely not be arrested. And that's because there's a risk of his supporters mobilising in the wake of such news. Naturally, there could be various other consequences. And destabilising the situation could prove too easy.

“The authorities' primary instinct, I would think, is to maintain stability, predictability and control over the situation. And Tashiyev's cooperation with the investigation, and with the authorities in general—first, to maintain this stability, not to organise or undertake any destabilising measures, and, in measured amounts, to confess to the offences or any other misdeeds that occurred under his control, under his leadership—is probably what they want.

"What's happening now in some Ministry of Internal Affairs office, I believe, is probably not so much an interrogation about Kyrgyzneftegaz, or anything else, but rather a political conversation in general."

Azattyk also spoke with Bishkek-based political observer Adil Turdukulov, who said that the sequence of events surrounding Tashiyev and his entourage amounts to an attempt to systematically weaken the position of the president's former ally.

Said Turdukulov: "Tashiyev's so-called people weren't just in parliament, they were far from in just parliament, they were in all local government bodies, ministries, agencies, and so on. That's why these purges are happening. But it's hard to say what the outcome will be.

“Of course, this is an attempt to intimidate and demoralise Tashiyev's team, and to demoralise him personally. However, I doubt this is ultimately achievable, because Tashiyev remained in politics even during more difficult political times, and his role was strong, and even more so now, when he has connections, resources, money, influence, and a fairly stable electorate. Therefore, this is a factor... it’s very serious and very difficult to predict."

The power exercised by northerner Japarov and southerner Tashiyev relied on a system built on various personal alliances that co-existed. There is now a phase of power redistribution.

How much political clout Tashiyev retains is in question.

Might he have a trump card?

In further comments, Jurayev said: “All sorts of schemes are being exposed right now. We're learning all sorts of things now… and, most likely, much, much more [is to come]. And Kamchybek Tashiyev likely has something similar, something comparable [to what is known by the other side about him], concerning the president, or something that could hurt the president. So, most likely, the only thing left is this kind of compromising material. But right now, I think it's difficult to achieve anything with compromising material."

Akipress, meanwhile, has reported that the list of individuals hit by Japarov’s purge runs to well over 50 personnel changes so far.

As to Tashiyev’s intentions from here on in, there are of course alternative theories doing the rounds.

Peter Leonard, writing for Havli, his Substack on Central Asia, on March 19 observed: “A fresh photo of Tashiyev released online in recent days reveals a man who looks a far cry from the pugnacious, fence-climbing brawler of yore. He has been undergoing medical treatment abroad, and he looks it. In earlier years, cornering Tashiyev this way would have carried serious risk; he was not a man who accepted pressure quietly.

“Some believe the photo may be Tashiyev hoisting the white flag.”