Azerbaijani government-aligned media have accused Georgia of deliberately obstructing Azerbaijani freight traffic and imposing punitive railway tariffs, alleging that Tbilisi is reacting nervously to the planned “Trump Route” that would reduce Georgia’s long-standing logistical dominance in the South Caucasus. Georgian authorities have rejected the claims as “disinformation”, while Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze has moved to defuse at least part of the dispute by ordering a one-off free rail shipment of Azerbaijani fuel to Armenia.

The row comes as Azerbaijan and the United States promote the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) – a multimodal link that would connect mainland Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic via southern Armenia, and from there to Armenia and Turkey, bypassing Georgian territory. The route is known as the Zangezur transit corridor in Azerbaijan. 

The controversy first surfaced in late November in Baku-based pro-government outlets Caliber.az and Minval Politika, which claimed that Georgian customs and police were systematically delaying Azerbaijani lorries at border crossings and inland customs posts. Given the high degree of state control over Azerbaijan’s media ecosystem, particularly over government-aligned outlets such as Caliber.az and Minval Politika, these publications are widely read in the region as informal extensions of the Presidential Administration’s messaging. In this context, the tone and timing of the reports about Georgian customs are likely to reflect not merely editorial choice, but an unofficial signal from Baku – a way of testing pressure on Tbilisi and shaping the narrative around the emerging TRIPP without the need for formal diplomatic demarches.

Caliber.az asserted that what initially appeared to be “minor technical issues” had, over weeks, turned into a pattern that “had nothing in common with the previously predictable system”. The outlet cited long-haul drivers who said they had worked the route for decades but now faced an environment in which “order gave way to chaos, politeness to rudeness, and the law to arbitrary decisions”. Drivers quoted by Azerbaijani media reported being held for up to three weeks at a customs office in Tbilisi despite, they said, having their paperwork in order. They complained of “rudeness” from Georgian customs officers and road police, and of documentation being “deliberately delayed”. Some drivers said it was “hinted” that procedures could be accelerated in exchange for informal payments, which the outlets framed as evidence of corruption.

Minval Politika reported that problems had begun as early as September and were not limited to trucks carrying tobacco and tobacco products, although those consignments appeared to be particularly affected. Azerbaijani drivers claimed that customs officers and police were “picking on” vehicles with Azerbaijani plates, while Georgian and other foreign lorries passed relatively quickly. Both outlets said drivers were often given no clear explanation for the delays and were sometimes refused interpretation into Azerbaijani or Turkish. Minval Politika characterised the situation as going far beyond “bureaucratic difficulties”, arguing that Georgian officers’ insistence on using certain local banks for payments resembled “corruption schemes”.

Caliber.az also reported that some drivers had been told to “go through Zangezur” or to wait “until your Zangezur Corridor is ready”, presenting these remarks as an indication that parts of the Georgian bureaucracy view the emerging alternative route with hostility. In their articles, Caliber.az and Minval Politika floated three main explanations for the alleged obstruction:

First, they argued that Georgia is “emotionally sensitive” to the prospect of losing its de facto monopoly on East-West transit from Azerbaijan, which has underpinned its Middle Corridor branding for decades. Caliber.az said that, from Tbilisi’s perspective, “even the possibility of an alternative route is perceived as a painful development”, despite the fact that a Zangezur corridor “expands the network – it does not replace it”.

Second, the Azerbaijani outlets pointed to what they described as the presence of Armenian-linked figures in Georgian politics and bureaucracy, through family origins, biography or political sympathies, who, they claimed, may be using technical procedures to express hostility towards a “strengthening Azerbaijan”. These actors, the outlets argued, do not set Georgia’s strategic line but are sufficiently embedded to influence sensitive operational decisions.

Third, Caliber.az referred to “analytical articles” suggesting that Georgia’s evolving relationship with its “northern neighbour”, a clear reference to Russia, could also be at play. According to this line of argument, certain groups “oriented toward the interests” of Moscow are displeased that Zangezur-related agreements were reached in Washington and that the project is moving ahead without Russian involvement. These groups, the outlet suggested, might be using any convenient pretext to complicate the movement of Azerbaijani freight as a form of pressure.

While presenting these as possibilities rather than proven facts, Caliber.az and Minval Politika framed the situation as part of a wider recalibration of regional transit, in which Georgia’s long-held advantages are being challenged and Azerbaijan is consolidating its status as a military and economic centre of the South Caucasus. The dispute over customs procedures was soon followed by a second front: rail transit tariffs.

On December 5, Minval Politika published an article headlined “Georgia is playing against the world: Tbilisi is testing the limits of Baku’s patience”, claiming that the two countries’ border commissions had discussed exports of Azerbaijani oil products to Armenia. Because there is no direct rail connection between Azerbaijan and Armenia, those shipments must transit via Georgia.

Citing an unnamed source, the outlet said Baku had requested tariff terms from Tbilisi for the Gardabani-Sadakhlo railway section and alleged that the Georgian side offered a rate “20-40 times” higher than comparable tariffs for similar cargo. The article described the move as incompatible with the scale of Azerbaijani investment in Georgia and warned that “a country in whose economy Baku has consistently invested and supported for decades cannot afford the luxury of ignoring Azerbaijan’s interests”.

Amid rising criticism in Azerbaijani media and what the economy ministry in Tbilisi described as “requests from partner countries”, Kobakhidze instructed Georgian Railways on 5 December to allow “immediate” one-off transit of Azerbaijani fuel to Armenia free of charge. The economy ministry said Georgia “is and remains a strategic and reliable partner of Armenia and Azerbaijan” and has consistently supported regional peace and connectivity. Official Tbilisi has firmly denied that Azerbaijani trucks are being deliberately targeted.

Responding to a question from Georgian business outlet BM.GE, Kobakhidze said on December 2 that he had “checked” the reports and found no evidence of systemic delays. “As far as I know, there was a delay in only one case, and for a specific reason,” he said, adding that Georgia was ready to hold “very friendly discussions” on any difficulties.

Georgia’s Revenue Service issued a formal statement rejecting as “disinformation” claims circulating in Georgian and Azerbaijani media about an alleged “blockade” of Azerbaijani cargo, including tobacco shipments. The agency called the reports “a complete lie” aimed at misleading the public and insisted that all customs procedures are being conducted in “special/active mode” to ensure uninterrupted clearance amid increased cargo volumes. The Revenue Service said customs officers at all checkpoints, including the Red Bridge crossing with Azerbaijan, were working 24/7 and that Georgia remains in “intensive communication” with the customs administrations of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia to address logistical challenges. It also stressed that Georgian customs strictly monitor exports and transit to prevent sanctioned Russian and Belarusian goods reaching prohibited destinations, and vice versa, underlining that tighter controls may affect some shipments.

Roman Gotsiridze, a former president of the National Bank of Georgia and ex-MP for the opposition United National Movement, argued in a Facebook post that much of what he called the Azerbaijani media “campaign” looked designed to “whip up hysteria” and pressure Georgia. He said it was wrong to frame the situation simply as Georgian Dream “antagonising neighbours” and to line up “unequivocally behind the Azerbaijani position”. Instead, he called for the dispute to be examined through the lens of Georgia’s long-term economic interests. Gotsiridze noted that Armenia currently relies on Georgia’s ports and railways for its supplies, including 100% of its fuel imports, and warned that structural shifts are under way: Russia’s railway network has now been linked to Armenia via Azerbaijan, and a direct rail connection between Azerbaijan and Armenia is being restored. He said Azerbaijani oil products will be supplied to Armenia directly by rail over Georgian territory, and that Tbilisi and Baku are in dispute over transit tariffs on the 111 km Gardabani-Sadakhlo section.

He also pointed to the impending expiry in 2026 of Georgia’s preferential gas-supply agreement via the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline, noting that, in a context where Azerbaijani gas is in high demand in Europe after cuts in Russian supplies, Tbilisi’s bargaining position is weaker. “They [Azerbaijan] are making us feel that the trump cards are in their hands – above all, our dependence on Azerbaijani gas,” he wrote. Gotsiridze argued that Georgia’s “international isolation” under the current government reduces its ability to defend national interests in negotiations with neighbours, and said all sides’ actions should be read as pursuit of their own strategic priorities.

Within Azerbaijan, the dispute has also been linked to Baku’s own decision to keep its land border with Georgia closed to ordinary travellers for nearly five years, officially on public-health grounds. Opposition politician Ilgar Mammadov suggested that Georgian authorities may be exploiting Azerbaijani frustration over the border closure to force the issue. He wrote that Tbilisi “saw that the Azerbaijani people cannot get their own government to reopen the land borders” and therefore “started creating all sorts of economic obstacles” in the hope that Baku, tired of those obstacles, would finally move. Mammadov argued that permanently closed borders contradict norms of good neighbourliness and have already caused significant losses to the Georgian economy. He suggested that further pressure from Georgia could eventually help restore Azerbaijani citizens’ right to cross the border “on foot, as human beings”.