Over the past week, two moves in East Asia and Europe clearly signal that the handling of the ‘Taiwan question’ is entering a new phase. It is one in which neither Tokyo nor Brussels is prepared simply to abide by a carefully calibrated diplomatic equilibrium coordinated from Beijing.

The emergence of Japan’s new prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, with her hawkish remarks about Taiwan, in which she said any blockade of the country by Chinese forces would be tantamount to a “national survival crisis situation”, coupled to the European Union’s decision to allow Taiwan’s vice-president, Hsiao Bi‑khim, to speak at the European Parliament where she became the first ever sitting Taiwanese vice-president to do so, represent a bolder posture by both Tokyo and Brussels and a more direct than usual challenge to the diplomatic norms that Beijing has long counted on.

Japan’s turning point
Takaichi’s comments in Japan’s Diet, that a Chinese military move against Taiwan might constitute “a situation threatening [Japan’s] survival” and subsequently trigger Japan’s own self-defence mobilisation, depart from Tokyo’s longstanding strategy of ambiguity.

Historically, Japanese prime ministers have avoided naming Taiwan in scenarios deemed to trigger Japan’s exercise of collective self-defence as was widely reported in the hours and days after she spoke, but her move signals a willingness to link Japan’s regional security directly with Taiwan’s status after years of bilateral parliamentary exchanges between the two.

That shift should not be seen purely as rhetorical grandstanding – this is a woman known to idolise Britain’s Iron Lady of lore – former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

Japan under Takaichi already reaffirms its alliance with the United States, and is actively exploring deeper defence cooperation, including in supply-chains and strategic minerals.

In late October a press release by Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) addressed the Japan – US, October 28 summit in the Japanese capital at which both Prime Minister Takaichi and US President Donald Trump stressed the need to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

Taiwan’s MOFA went on to add that “The maintenance of cross-strait peace and stability is crucial to the security and prosperity of the world. Taiwan will continue to actively implement its Four Pillars of Peace action plan and enhance its self-defence capabilities. Taiwan will also further deepen exchanges and cooperation with friendly countries and allies through integrated diplomacy so as to jointly defend democratic values, advance peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and throughout the region, and maintain the rules-based international order.”

The implication in Takaichi’s latest comment is thus remarkably clear - regardless of how China perceives it - Tokyo now views any possible coercion of Taiwan not just as a matter for Washington’s deterrence, but as a stake-for-Japan issue.

This raises serious questions for Tokyo’s relations with Beijing.

As one analyst, Ryo Sahashi, a professor at the University of Tokyo’s Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia quoted by The Japan Times put it: “It is conceivable that Japan could recognise a situation threatening its very existence even without being directly attacked,” before adding a somewhat cautionary “However, there is little merit in the government pre-emptively listing such examples. It yields no diplomatic advantage.”

That lack of diplomatic advantage was soon evident as Beijing’s response was sharp: the Chinese consul-general in Osaka, Xue Jian, issued a now-deleted social media post threatening Takaichi’s “dirty neck”. Such language by Chinese officials underscores how volatile the region has become even if national leaders shake hands and smile for cameras at regional and global events.

For Japan’s part, the shift may reflect broader strategy: Tokyo is re-thinking its defence posture in the context of declining credibility of deterrence in East Asia, a more assertive Beijing and an uncertain US umbrella under the Trump administration.

Its reference to Taiwan no longer as a peripheral issue but as a potential trigger event for Japan’s own self-defence force deployment is significant. And it also sends a message to allies and adversaries alike that Japan is willing to take direct and open interest in Taiwan’s fate.

Europe’s symbolic move
Simultaneously, across Eurasia, the EU has taken a notable step with Taiwan’s vice-president, Hsiao Bi-khim addressing the annual summit of the Inter‑Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) held at the European Parliament in Brussels.

Beijing immediately registered its displeasure, and in typical form accused the EU of serious interference in China’s ‘internal affairs’.

While the speech by Hsiao was delivered in an unofficial parliamentary gathering rather than at a formal EU foreign-policy event, the symbolism matters. Hsiao told the gathering: “Europe has defended freedom under fire. And Taiwan has defended democracy under pressure” ABC News reported, at the same time urging deeper trade, technology and security ties with EU partners while warning that peace in the Taiwan Strait was “a cornerstone of global prosperity.”

To a standing ovation, Hsiao added “In an era marked by increasing fragmentation, volatility and rising authoritarianism, this gathering affirms something vital - that democracies, even when far apart, are not alone” the ABC report added.

For Brussels, the decision to let Hsiao speak appears to signal two things: one, a recognition that Taiwan is no longer a peripheral “China issue” but integral to global democratic and technological supply-chains; and two, a willingness to test the limits of the conventional “one-China policy” façade by offering Taiwan high-visibility diplomatic space.

Why now, and what it means?
Taken together, the moves by Tokyo and Brussels thus reflect a broader recalibration in East Asia’s environment. First and foremost is the reality that Taiwan’s strategic importance has gone far beyond cross-strait impasse. It lies at the centre of global semiconductor supply-chains, emerging geopolitics of technological blocs, and alliance architecture anchored on democratic values. Taiwan is the “trusted partner” as Hsiao said.

Secondly, the normative dimension is increasingly important. Both Japan and the EU are signalling that unilateral attempts by Beijing to change the status quo by force will no longer go unanswered. Takaichi’s language of “survival-threatening situation” was planned, and converts deterrence bluster into actionable framing under Japan’s security laws. In knock-on effect, the EU’s hosting of Hsiao converts years of moral support into visible diplomatic choice.

Third – and perhaps more subtle - this can be seen as a moment when the old balance of “strategic ambiguity” is under pressure. Japan is moving away from vague formulations and will continue to do so under Takaichi; Europe meanwhile is moving from quiet support to elevated public engagement of Taiwan – still some what behind Japan but important nonetheless. That dynamic is guaranteed to provoke Beijing, but also to reflect the calculated risk-taking by democratic powers.

Risks and complications
Yet while the direction is clear, so too are the risks. For Japan, treading more openly into Taiwan matters increases the likelihood of direct confrontation with China. Washington may welcome the shift as another political front opens on China but Tokyo must tread carefully so as not to be drawn into a conflict it cannot control.

For the EU, the pretence of neutrality under the one-China policy remains – for now. Brussels must, however, reconcile its commercial ties with Beijing, its energy dependence, and its tradition of diplomatic caution with a new, more assertive posture. Beijing’s protest over Hsiao’s visit to IPAC signals that China is content to push back non-militarily - through economic, diplomatic and propaganda means.

Furthermore, the bilateral nature of these actions - Japan on one side of China, the EU on the other - poses questions about coherence of a wider strategy. Without a common multilateral framework tying Tokyo, Brussels, Washington and Taipei, the risk is of mismatched escalation or fragmentation of approach, rather than disciplined deterrence. And as the world has seen with Europe’s half-hearted and fragmented response to the issue of Ukraine, Brussels is no ally to rely upon when the chips are down.

In sum therefore, what we are witnessing is not merely isolated diplomatic provocation of China, by Tokyo and Brussels, but the establishment of a new set of alliances and postures in East Asia’s Taiwan-China equation.

Japan, under Takaichi, is openly signalling that the fate of Taiwan, a 50-year colony run from Tokyo from 1895 to 1945, is no longer someone else’s business - it is a matter of Japanese survival. The EU, by elevating Taiwan’s voice in Brussels, is signalling that the island matters to the global democratic community – a group China is not qualified to join.

For its part, Beijing will not accept such shifts without contesting them - but that contest may now play out more frequently and more openly on the stage of diplomacy. The question for democratic powers regarding China’s continued anti-Taiwan efforts, is how to convert these symbolic moves into sustained deterrence without stumbling into unwanted conflict.